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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to explore the connection 
between Jonathan Swift, Thomas Hobbes, and the classical 
philosophers Epicurus and Lucretius. The literary pieces analyzed 
are Lucretius's De Rerum Natura {On the Nature o f Things), 
Thomas Hobbes's De Homine and Leviathan, and Swift's letters,
A Tale of a Tub, and Gulliver's Travels.
First, the fundamental ideas of Lucretius are established. 
Then, those ideas are compared to the later work of Thomas 
Hobbes, and found to serve as a foundation for his works De 
Homine and Leviathan. In addition to revealing characteristics 
similar to those of Lucretius, Hobbes introduces his belief that 
mankind is neither naturally rational nor innately good, and explains 
that in essence it is fear o f one another that prompts men to live in a 
society governed by laws.
Jonathan Swift, through his letters, and A Tale of a Tub 
and Gulliver's Travels, addresses the ideas of Hobbes, and as a 
result those of Lucretius. Though he professes to despise their 
ideas, he in fact reveals himself to be a Hobbist/Lucretian in certain 
ironic and important ways. This paradox is the main focus of the 
thesis.
SWIFT’S VEXED SATIRE OF HOBBES AND LUCRETIUS
In the eighteenth century there raged a debate that would leave an indelible mark 
on all philosophy of human nature to follow. It revolved around the issue of the true 
nature of man, and it involved two very distinct schools of thought, one insisted that man 
was an inherently good being, whose evil actions were a symptom of being led astray by 
the temptations and complications of a strongly governed society. The other, rooted most 
recently in the theories of Thomas Hobbes, maintained that man was rather a selfish brute 
at heart, forced to enter into contract with his fellow beasts to form a society in which he 
could live without fear of the terrible ills that would surely befall him in what Hobbes 
called "the state of nature." While some took their beliefs to debating chambers or 
coffeehouses, men such as Jonathan Swift took pen in hand and wrote several pieces of 
literature that address, if somewhat obliquely, the debate and their position within it. In 
his A Tale of a Tub and Gulliver’s Travels. Swift reveals what appears to be a paradox: in 
the former work he claims to write specifically against Thomas Hobbes, but in the latter he 
appears to subscribe to some of Hobbes's ideas, and to his theories on the nature of man.
It is this dynamic that invites a study of the relationship between Thomas Hobbes and 
Jonathan Swift. The most effective means of initiating such an analysis is to become 
familiar with Hobbes as Swift would have known him, that is, through his two most 
powerful works, Leviathan and De Homine.
I.
Published in 1651 as Thomas Hobbes's culminating achievement in political 
science, Leviathan is a seventeenth - century manifesto designed to reveal not only what 
man is, but what he ought to be. By first attempting to define man and the motivations
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for his behavior, Hobbes establishes him as little more than an animal whose only priority 
is self-preservation. After having done so, he then reveals his theory on the ways in which 
a society populated by such creatures generates what he identifies as the artificial man, or 
leviathan. Hobbes then elaborates further by explaining that it is this leviathan that gives 
birth to the "Commonwealth," and so his logic rests upon a linear connection which binds 
man at his most primitive to Mankind and its need for social contracts. The focus 
throughout is to prove that such an evolution is the direct result of man's living within the 
atomistic, materialistic, and atheistic universe, as was proposed in a later piece, De 
Homine, written in 1658. Man's self - preservation, Hobbes seems to believe, is the fertile 
soil in which germinate, alternately, peace and war, sovereignty and religion. From this 
soil flourish the societies that must enter into contracts or else be lost again in the State of 
Nature. But Hobbes's findings were not wholly original - - nor would Swift have thought 
them so. Throughout Leviathan lay the artifacts of an earlier philosophy, namely that 
recorded by the Latin poet and Epicurean philosopher Lucretius. Writing between 98 and 
55 B.C., Lucretius was a devoted disciple of the third century B.C. Greek philosopher 
Epicurus, whose theories revolved around a therapeutic disbelief in the divine creation and 
government, and in the afterlife. Epicurus held that such a suspension of conventional 
dogma would allow for the pursuit of earthly pleasures without fear of punishment from 
the gods while on earth, or o f eternal damnation once dead. In effect, then, Epicurus 
made strides to eliminate mystery and fear by replacing them, through science, with logical 
explanations for natural phenomena. Lucretius, with these concepts as his foundation, 
composed his poem On the Nature of Things in order to reinforce the Epicurean 
explanations for those things about the world that had first inspired men to attribute them 
to divinity. Its style and many of its ideas were borrowed by Hobbes. Through a study of 
Leviathan and On the Nature of Thipgs. the Epicurean/Lucretian origins of Hobbes's 
masterpiece becomes quite clear.
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Thomas Hobbes wrote his manifesto under the assumption that it is the desire of 
every man to hold dominion and wield power over all other men. This instinct, coupled 
with that of self-preservation, leads to the need for sovereign leadership by one person and 
a contract, each man with the other, to bind violent hands and greedy natures. In Part I, 
Chapter XIII, O f the Naturall Condition o f Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and 
Misery, Hobbes asserts, "in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. 
First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory" (Leviathan, 185). By "nature" 
one may assume is meant that all men are bom with a predisposition to quarrel. It is this 
predisposition that Hobbes addresses later in the same chapter as he explains that the 
"Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are 
necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them" (Leviathan, 
188). It is clear that, in Hobbes's opinion, mankind suffers perpetual conflict, both 
internal and external; and even the basis for peace is a dynamic tension between our fears 
and hopes. In order to maintain a balance between them, and as well ensure a safe 
environment in which a society may thrive, Hobbes claims to uncover certain "Lawes of 
Nature" which, through science, will in turn yield morality and the generation of the 
"Common-Wealth."
The Lex Naturalis, or Law of Nature, is for Hobbes any rule or precept by which a 
man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his own life or the life of another. He is 
quick to distinguish the Law of Nature from the Jus Naturale, or Right of Nature, which, 
in giving men equality gives them also equal right to use their own power to do anything 
they reason necessary for their own well-being. The law binds, whereas the right permits, 
and it is due to the latter that the former must be installed willingly by humanity. Note the 
following passage from Leviathan in which Hobbes infers another Lex Naturalis.
From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which 
men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived 
this second Law; That a man be willing, when others
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are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and 
defence o f himselfe he shall think it necessary, 
to lay down his right to all things; and be contented 
with so much liberty against other men, as he would 
allow other men against himselfe. (Leviathan. 190)
These two fundamental Laws of Nature do in fact replace natural liberties - - those of 
every man for himself - - with a liberty Hobbes, and humanity, values more - - that of 
security. The freedom of killing his neighbor for his silver is now the freedom for a man 
to, ideally, leave unlatched the door in the confidence that his neighbor will not kill him for 
the same reason. This defines, in Leviathan, a covenant. The covenant, or agreement, 
while ideal for the elimination of what Hobbes believes to be the condition of man - - "a 
condition of Warre of every one against every one" (Leviathan, 189) - - cannot go 
unmonitored. It is this fact that makes necessary the generation of Hobbes's "Common­
wealth," which he calls as well, "Leviathan."
The meanings of the word "leviathan" are quite varied. Although its origin is 
unknown, it had been used before Hobbes to represent a sea monster in Hebrew poetry, 
Satan (1595), a man of vast power or wealth (1607), and anything huge and/or monstrous 
(1624). With the publication of Leviathan in 1651, Hobbes was the first to apply it to the 
commonwealth as an organism. Past uses of the word, quite negative in meaning, invite 
pause to wonder at the author's choice. Does it reflect the commonwealth as a body "of 
vast power or wealth," or simply a "monstrous" collection of beings whose natures may 
themselves be so called - - even evil, as the 1595 use suggests? It is obvious that Hobbes 
believes man naturally incapable of peace and goodwill, and it is arguable that his title 
reflects his disgust with human brutishness. The brutes, however, may be made more 
reasonable within the ironically liberating chains of the commonwealth, which itself must 
be governed by one man - - the sovereign. Thus Hobbes lets sail his leviathan, with its 
masthead the sovereign, thrust forth by the mutual consent of the men within it, kept safe
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by laws and covenant but threatened by the natural instincts of man to enter into the State 
of Nature, or perpetual warfare, as the following passage implies:
This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is 
called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS.
This is the Generation of that LEVIATHAN, or rather 
(to speake more reverently) of the Mortall 
God, to which wee owe under the Immortall 
God, our peace and defence. (Leviathan. 227)
In an apology for using the term "Leviathan" in his description of the evolution from the 
brutish individual to a society bound by a common leader, Hobbes indicates an awareness 
of the more sinister definitions of the word. It seems not a title to be desired, yet he 
identifies it clearly with the "Mortall God" created by men through joining in contract, and 
so invites an investigation into its generation and its connection with the "Immortall God' 
created, Hobbes will affirm, through the fear of man. It is here, in philosophy of religion, 
that Lucretius and Hobbes meet, and put forth physical, material evidence to explain away 
those mysteries that first caused man to force the unknown into the more secure mold of a 
divine being.
In his Epicurean poem, On the Nature of Things. Lucretius sings of the success of 
his mentor in bringing to mortals equality with the heavens. His method is to regress to 
the very beginnings of the world, dissecting creation to reveal a series of physical causes 
for its creation; he is able to attribute every mystery of the world to atomism, or 
materialism, by which all worldly occurrences can be explained by considering them in 
terms of physical matter and science. From there he moves to the logical results o f the 
science he extols, and uses those results to eliminate superstition. In so doing, he also 
attempts to put an end to fear of the unknown and, in his polytheistic society, fear of the 
gods, and follows his heroic model, Epicurus:
When human life to view lay foully prostrate upon earth
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crushed down under the weight of religion, who showed 
her head from the quarters of heaven with hideous aspect 
lowering upon mortals, a man of Greece [Epicurus] 
ventured first to lift up his mortal eyes to her face and 
first to withstand her to her face. Him neither story of 
gods nor thunderbolts nor heaven with threatening roar 
could quell: they only chafed the more eager courage of his 
soul, filling him with desire to be the first to burst the fast 
bars of nature's portals. Therefore the living force of his 
soul gained the day: on he passed far beyond the flaming 
walls of the world and traversed throughout in mind and 
spirit the immeasurable universe; whence he returns a 
conqueror to tell us what can, what cannot come into 
being; in short on what principle each thing has its powers 
defined, its deepset boundary mark. Therefore religion is 
put under foot and trampled upon in turn; us his victory 
brings level with heaven. (Lucretius, 1. 62-79))
It is religion, Lucretius argues, which has led so many down the path of sin. The terror of 
men at not being able to explain a bolt of lightning or the changing of the tides caused 
them to attribute all o f creation to the gods. It is the intention of Lucretius to disprove the 
creative power of these gods by explaining "first - beginnings," or the generation of the 
physical world by movements equally physical in nature.
All o f nature is founded on two things: bodies and voids. The joining and 
separating of like bodies causes every element to occur, and those elements have, from the 
beginning of time, combined and moved to make up the world. That fish breathe in water 
and suffocate in an environment of air alone is, for example, a matter of physics rather 
than the hand of a god. The same logic applies to man. Hobbes reinforces this 
atomistic/materialistic idea in a work published in 1658, Dfi Homine. or Concerning Man. 
when he writes o f our very emotions that they "consist in various motions of the blood and 
animal spirits" (55) and that the feelings of glory and shame, as well as the reactions 
manifested by weeping and laughter, are all caused by actual movements within the human 
frame (58-59). Lucretius addresses the constitution of man from a purely physical
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perspective, insisting that "the nature of the mind and soul is bodily" (32). Reason must 
admit, continues the poet, that since the soul is bodily, the death of the body is also the 
death of the soul. A dead soul will therefore have no afterlife - - no punishment or praise - 
- nothing to fear. Rather, the punishment consists of a life on earth full of the unnecessary 
fear and guilt created out of man's self-imposed religious dogma, as Lucretius here notes:
But there is in life a dread of punishment for evil 
deeds, signal as the deeds are signal, and for atonement 
of guilt, the prison and the frightful hurling down from 
the rock, scourgings, executioners, the dungeon of the 
doomed, the pitch, the metal plate, torches; and even 
though these are wanting, yet the conscience-stricken 
mind through boding fears applies to itself goads and 
frightens itself with whips, and sees not meanwhile 
what end there can be of ills or what limit at last is to 
be set to punishments, and fears lest these very evils 
be enhanced after death. The life of fools at length 
becomes a hell here on earth. (Lucretius, 1. 1010 -1023)
The gods, then, did not create the world, but men created the gods to account for 
the mysteries of it; they did so to allay fear, but ironically only came to fear the gods they 
themselves created. Lucretius's irony is that men create religion out of fear, and so create 
for themselves misery. By attempting to prove such an idea as fact, Lucretius lays the 
foundations for a new kind of man, one who, with nothing to fear, is free to indulge in 
every proper earthly pleasure and delight - - ethically and rightly. The progression from 
the physical to the scientific to the ethical is made clear: science has disproved the 
existence of a higher power and so, logically, man no longer need adhere to a code of 
ethics founded upon it.
Thomas Hobbes addresses the same issue as that of Lucretius mentioned above in 
Leviathan; Part I, Chapter XII, O f Religion. Noting that man is the only being in which 
the signs of religion may be observed, Hobbes concludes that the seeds of religion are 
solely within him as well. In the notes that accompany the text in its margins, he continues
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to summarize the characteristics peculiar to man, namely "his desire of Knowing causes, 
[his] consideration of the Beginning of things, [and] his observation of the Sequell of 
things," which predispose him to create a divine explanation for that which he cannot 
comprehend (Leviathan, 168-169). "The naturall Cause of Religion," he concludes, is "the 
Anxiety of the time to come" (Leviathan. 169). The reflection of Lucretius here is 
unmistakable, and the following passage from Leviathan further explains man's "perpetuall 
feare" bom of his own creation:
For being assured that there be causes of all things that 
have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is 
impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth 
to secure himselfe against the evill he 
feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to 
be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So 
that every man, especially those that are over 
provident, are in an estate like that of Prometheus.
For as Prometheus (which interpreted, is, The prudent 
man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large 
prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, de­
voured in the day, as much as was repayred in the 
night: So that man, which looks too far before him, in 
the care of future time, hath his heart all the day 
long, gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other 
calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but 
in sleep. (Leviathan. 169)
Though Hobbes's use of a classical, polytheistic figure such as Prometheus alludes to a 
time well before that of Lucretius, it nevertheless calls him to mind, and his ideas with him. 
Hobbes reaches into the past and finds men have not changed. His desire to know the 
causes of that which goes on around him and a fear of the unknown future are to Hobbes, 
as well as his Epicurean ancestor, the causes of religion. In terms of the effect of religion 
on the commonwealth, Hobbes suggests that those first founders of it maintained fear in 
order to maintain peace, and so intertwined government with religion.
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The two philosophers also share a common belief regarding the nature of man. 
Both see him as a being intent on his own advancement at any cost, tempered only by his 
realization that all men have such intent for themselves, and that the safety of their 
society - - and, therefore, of themselves - - demands its sacrifice. Lucretius expresses 
this clearly in the passage below:
But men desired to be famous and powerful, 
in order that their fortunes might rest on a firm 
foundation and they might be able by their 
wealth to lead a tranquil life; but in vain, since in 
their struggle to mount up to the highest 
dignities they rendered their path one full of 
danger; and even if they reach it, yet envy like a 
thunderbolt sometimes strikes and dashes men 
down from the highest point with ignominy into 
noisome Tartarus... so that far better it is to obey 
in peace and quiet than to wish to rule with 
power supreme and be the master of 
kingdoms. (Lucretius, 1. 1123-1138)
And here:
For mankind, tired out with a life of brute force, 
lay exhausted from its feuds; and therefore the 
more readily it submitted of its own freewill to 
laws and stringent codes.
(Lucretius, 1. 1148-1151)
Such ideas echo back and forth between Lucretius and Hobbes. For both, science and 
reason explain needs and the progression of events. As a result, the mystery once 
associated with creation is banished, and the philosophers proceed to design a new system 
of ethics based on purely physical foundations. This conclusion, then, allows one to 
approach the eighteenth century, and Jonathan Swift, whose Tale of a Tub is deliberately
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and explicitly framed as a response to Leviathan (and so to Lucretius), with a greater 
understanding of the origin and history of the ideas with which he takes issue.
Woven from the rich fibers of allegory and digression, Jonathan Swift's A Tale of a 
Tub, first published in 1704, is a masterful satire of the zealous tenets of eighteenth- 
century modernism. In it the reader encounters everything from the arguments between 
ancients and modems, to a treatise on the beneficial characteristics of madness, to an 
imaginative retelling of Christian history. Its subject matter, in short, is varied and 
motley - - a seemingly stream-of-consciousness record of its author's colorful and often 
contradictory opinions. Still, while various tangents and non sequiturs may lead the 
reader to his or her own confusion, the work itself, and indeed its strange style and 
construction, serve a distinct and clear purpose - -to lay to rest two fundamental 
Epicurean principles that led to Hobbes's Leviathan and works like it. The first, espoused 
by Lucretius, is that every occurrence, be it earthly or supernatural, is explicable through 
physical materialism and the movements and combinations of atoms. Indeed, this is the 
fundamental lesson of Hobbes's earlier work, De Homine. As previously discussed, such 
extreme focus on the physical nature of the world provided for the Epicurean a system of 
disbelief in forces divine. The second principle against which Swift ventures is the 
utilitarianism that Hobbes offers as explanation for the common system of ethics 
embraced by man. Hobbes removes from the daily lives of men their own reason, 
emotion, and free will: it is not because they are rational that they develop laws, 
governments, societies; not because they are creative that they produce art, music, and 
literature; not because they are naturally sympathetic and warm that they develop 
friendships and reproduce families. It is because men have joined in a tacit utilitarian 
contract. In De Homine he states that politics and ethics are "the sciences of the just and 
unjust, o f equity and inequity" (42), and that both are accepted because, like friendship, 
art, and invention, they are useful (49-50). James Moore identifies the same penchant in
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the work of Epicurus, and so strengthens the connection between Epicurus and Hobbes
within the school of philosophical skepticism:
Epicurean moralists perceived the virtue of justice 
to be derived from nothing but its utility. "Justice is 
nothing in itself," Epicurus said. "Mankind, united in 
Society, discovered the Utility and Advantage of 
agreeing among themselves."... Epicurus and his 
followers observed that, once the laws had curbed 
and regulated differences of temperament, it was 
possible for some, at least, to live in sympathy with 
one another. (Moore, 29)
It is these two profound and pessimistic principles that Jonathan Swift attempts to 
disavow through A Tale of a Tub. To begin a study of how Swift accomplishes this 
weighty task, it is wisest to first analyze the personality behind the pen; not, as one might 
assume, Jonathan Swift himself, but the persona who claims to be the author of A Tale 
of a Tub.
n.
It is difficult to paint a true portrait of the persona in A Tale of a Tub. In his preface 
he claims to be "a most devoted Servant of all Modern Forms" (Swift, Writings, 286) and 
displays pride at his membership in the Grub Street fraternity. The student of Swift 
recognizes immediately that the Dean and the "author" are far from being of one mind. 
Quite early in the work it becomes clear that Swift, champion of the ancient school, 
intends to use his modem persona to expose the weaknesses of modernity itself. He 
manipulates the persona into countless embarrassments and contradictions, ultimately 
discovering him as a madman. Not the least of his formula for doing so involves the 
extreme egoism of the persona; such self-involvement, combined with what John R. Clark
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calls the urgent "presentness" of modems in general, results in a combination described 
well by Clark:
This overwhelming presentness gives the Tale o f a Tub 
its atmosphere of impulsion and colors its modem 
author as well with a pervasive egotism. As if in haste, 
the Modem always speaks in the first person singular and 
always in the present tense, preferably in the progressive 
present: "I am now trying an Experiment" ...; "I do 
here gladly embrace" ...; "I am now advancing"... ;'I do 
here humbly propose" ...; "I proceed to refute" ...
(Clark, 119-120)
Overwhelmingly concerned with only contemporary events and his own place within 
them, the persona reveals himself as something of a fool, not unlike the inward-looking 
Struldbruggs of Swift's later work, Gulliver's Travels.
At the start of his writing, the persona claims that his purpose is to produce a 
diversion for removing attention from Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, which he has been 
told, and believes, is a danger to the Commonwealth of England. Recalling that the work 
is based upon the theories of Epicurus, as recorded by Lucretius, it is an interestingly 
ironic task to analyze the persona in terms of Epicurean/Lucretian ideas about man. 
Thomas Hobbes distinguishes between two extreme states of mind, sensuality and 
fancifulness; the "sensual man" seeks only momentary pleasures of the senses, which lead 
him to "ignore honor or future events and goals, until he becomes progressively less 
diligent, less curious, less sensible, withdrawing into himself with a totally inert lassitude 
common to many a psychotic" (Clark, 26). In many ways this defines the modem 
persona of A Tale of a Tub: he is merely concerned with his own ideas and schemes, and 
slowly "devolves into madness" (Clark, 38), as revealed later in his Digression 
concerning the Original, the Use and Improvement o f Madness in a Commonwealth.
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Ironically, that pursuit of momentary sensual pleasure echoes some of the ideas of 
Epicurus, which laid the foundation for Hobbes.
Further, the modem persona personifies Hobbes's idea of the "good wit," which 
is defined as the ability to observe similitudes in all things, but, oddly enough, use that 
ability without discretion (Leviathan. 135) . As Clark explains, modems "have just such a 
fantastical ability to discover metaphysical metaphors in their imaginings - precisely 
without method, culture, or instruction" (Clark, 137). In addition, it is interesting to note 
the basic stylistic similarities between the persona and Hobbes. Both are masters of 
digression, often losing themselves in trains of thought that carry them away from their 
intended path. And yet, it must be noted that Hobbes disapproves of the "sensual man," 
espousing a qualified Epicureanism in its stead (perhaps even ultimately revealing himself 
a stoic).
Another characteristic of the modem narrator is his often contradictory manner. 
He frequently reverses his own profound claims, and, as Clark notes, "very consciously 
seeks to be paradoxical" (Clark, 182). For example, Clark continues, the persona 
"declares his ability to write 'On Nothing,' he argues that where his own writing is 
incomprehensible, 'it shall be concluded, that something very useful and profound is 
coucht underneath'...He praises destructive criticism ... extols digressions ... lauds 
madness"(Clark, 182). All of this he does with the extreme zeal of the most devoted 
modem disciple, thereby overturning his own credibility and replacing it with so many 
distractions that the reader is hardly surprised when, in Section IX, A Digression 
concerning the Original, the Use and Improvement o f Madness in a Commonwealth, he 
recommends that every "Student and Professor" in Bedlam be studied for his many talents 
and employed in "the several Offices in a state ***** Civil and Military," and that special 
consideration be given to this suggestion because he himself "had some Time the 
Happiness to be an unworthy Member" of that "honourable Society," Bedlam (Swift,
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353). In effect, then, the persona acknowledges that he is mad, and so his deterioration is 
complete.
Having established the persona with whose peculiarities the reader must deal, it is 
easier to address the manner and result of Swift's intentions - - namely to respond to 
Hobbes and those of his materialistic school. The most comprehensive way to do so is to 
examine in order of occurrence those references, veiled and obvious, that deal with the 
Hobbes/Epicurus/Lucretius issue. The first of these is found in the very first section of A 
Tale of a Tub, An Apology for the, &c. In defense of the pages to follow, the "author" 
maintains that there is nothing within them by which the Church of England can be 
offended, and that if objections are made, they would be better levied against other works 
more in need of criticism:
[The tale] contains nothing to provoke them [clergymen] by the 
least Scurillity upon their Persons or their Functions. It 
Celebrates the Church of England as the most perfect of 
all others in Discipline and Doctrine, it advances no 
Opinion they reject, nor condemns any they receive. If 
the Clergy's Resentments lay upon their Hands, in my 
humble Opinion, they might have found more proper 
Objects to employ them on ... I mean those heavy, illiterate 
Scriblers, prostitute in their Reputations, vicious in their 
Lives, and ruin'd in their Fortunes, who to the shame of 
good Sense as well as Piety, are greedily read, meerly 
upon the Strength of bold, false, impious Assertions, mixt 
with unmannerly Reflections upon the Priesthood, and 
openly intended against all Religion; in short, full o f such 
Principles as are kindly received, because they are levell'd 
to remove those Terrors that Religion tells Men will be the 
Consequence of immoral Lives. (Swift, Writings. 266)
The final words of the passage above are the most telling, if subtle. For what 
works before this time have gone farthest in removing the "Terrors" wrought upon man 
through religion and its threatening afterlife than those of Lucretius and Hobbes? Both
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philosophers urge the tortured layman to embrace materialism, and with it the complete 
death of body and soul at the moment of human expiration, thereby rejecting the 
commonly held ideas of religion with its "unmannerly Reflections upon the Priesthood."
It is to this rebellious theory that the modem persona refers, and at which he will continue 
to volley philosophical, and ultimately ineffectual, bombs. Maintaining later that indeed a 
reply to or criticism of one work (as his is to and of Leviathan) requires more talent and 
perspiration than the writing of the piece in question, the author moves through 
postscript and dedication until he arrives at his The Preface, in which he will explain, in a 
rare moment of clarity, the purpose of his tale.
Opening The Preface with an explanation of how his assignment came to be, the 
persona reveals that "the Grandees of Church and State" were becoming quite alarmed at 
the growing number of wits in society, and fearful that they would take it upon 
themselves to "pick Holes in the weak sides of Religion and Government" (Swift, 284).
To avoid such widespread attack, continues our narrator, he himself was called upon to 
provide a diversion for the wits, the model for which was bom of certain maritime 
practices:
Mean while the Danger hourly increasing, by new Levies of 
Wits all appointed (as there is Reason to fear) with Pen, Ink, and 
Paper which may at an hours Warning be drawn out into 
Pamphlets, and other Offensive Weapons, ready for immediate 
Execution: It was judged of absolute necessity, that some present 
Expedient be thought on, till the main Design can be brought to 
Maturity. To this End, at a Grand Committee, some days ago, this 
important Discovery was made by a certain curious and refined 
Observer; That Sea-men have a Custom when they meet a 
Whale, to fling out an empty Tub, by way of an Amusement, to 
divert him from laying violent Hands upon the Ship. This Parable 
was immediately mythologiz'd: The Whale was interpreted to be 
Hobbes's Leviathan, which tosses and plays with all other Schemes 
of Religion and Government, whereof a great many are hollow, and 
dry, and empty, and noisy, and wooden, and given to Rotation, This 
is the Leviathan from whence the terrible Wits of our Age are said 
to borrow their Weapons. The Ship in danger is easily understood
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to be its old Antitype the Commonwealth. ... And it was decreed, that 
in order to prevent these Leviathans from tossing and sporting with 
the Commonwealth, (which of it self is too apt to fluctuate) they should be 
diverted from that Game by a Tale o f a Tub. And my Genius being 
conceived to lye not unhappily that way, I had the Honor done me 
to be engaged in the Performance. (Swift, Writings. 284)
A Tale of a Tub? then, is the literary distraction intended to deliver the standards 
of Church and State from the predatory beast that is Leviathan, th e  persona believes 
that new philosophies such as those advanced by Hobbes will destroy the balance and 
order o f England itself, and invites the reader to believe that his "Genius" alone will be 
the means by which it is saved "till the main Design can be brought to Maturity." The 
reader might expect, therefore, that the tale to follow will contain a consistent series of 
facts and argument meant to debunk Hobbesian, and thereby in many ways Epicurean, 
philosophy, along with efforts to reaffirm those tenets of Christianity and monarchy 
believed to be in jeopardy. Instead, however, A Tale of a Tub is riddled with 
contradictions, reversals, and nonsensical connections that leave the reader quite unsure 
of the persona's agenda, and perhaps certain only of the fact that his proclaimed goal in 
The Preface has not been achieved.
One inconsistency displayed by the persona occurs quite early in the work, in 
Section I. The Introduction. In attempting to explain that in order to maintain the 
attention of the public one must obtain a "superiour Position o f Place," the persona 
reveals a weakness in his antipathy toward theories upsetting to the status quo by 
employing one to explain that by "place" he does not mean social status or political 
office, but literal physical placement above the public - - be it by pulpit, ladder, or stage:
FROM this accurate Deduction it is manifest, that for 
obtaining Attention in Publick, there is of necessity 
required a superiour Position o f Place. But, altho' 
this Point be generally granted, yet the Cause is little 
agreed in; and it seems to me, that very few Philosophers
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have fallen into a true, natural Solution of this Phenomenon.
The deepest Account, and the most fairly digested of 
any I have yet met with, is this, That Air being a heavy 
Body, and therefore (according to the System of Epicurus) 
continually descending, must needs be more so, when 
loaden and press'd down by Words. (Swift, Writings, 295)
Here, the champion of all things modem has called upon the theories of Epicurus to 
explain and support his claim that height lends superiority. Further, there exists a note 
within the text that gives Lucretius as the source used by the persona to discover that 
"System of Epicurus ." The irony here is unmistakable; Lucretius, in extolling the merits 
of Epicurean materialism - - looking only to the physical world to explain intangibles - - 
has as well helped the persona explain his own "modem" ideas in a work aimed at 
discrediting Hobbes's Leviathan, a work that itself is largely founded upon 
Epicurean/Lucretian tradition. This irony does not bode well for the supposedly learned 
persona. A student would undoubtedly be aware of the connection between Lucretius 
and Hobbes, and the fact that the persona seems oblivious of it places in doubt his right 
to be the creator of the tub. He even goes as far as including two lines from Lucretius's 
De RerunLNatum:
Corporeum quoque enim vocem constare fatendum est,
Etsonitum, quoniampossuni impellere Sensus. Lucr.Lib.4.
'Tis certain then, that Voice that thus can wound
Is all Material; Body every Sound. (Swift, Writings, 295)
So, employing ancient and disruptive theory in his argument against it, the persona 
launches his tub with one philosophical hole already in its side.
Leaving preliminary elements at last, the persona next moves to Section II, in 
which he begins the story of the three brothers, Peter, Martin and Jack, whose persons 
and lives represent the Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist faiths cloaked in the allegory of 
the temptations of high fashion. The brothers quickly encounter conflict when, left alone
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after the death of their father, and acting against the wishes set forth in his will, they 
invest in a new fashion (representing a new system of belief) and so embellish their simple 
but pure coats of Christianity with rich ornaments. The sect to which the brothers are 
attracted "held the Universe to be a large Suit o f Cloaths, which invests every Thing:
That the Earth is invested by the Air; The Air is invested by the Stars; and the Stars are 
invested by the Primum Mobile" (Swift, Writings. 304). It is obvious that the storyteller 
is disdainful of such new systems of belief, especially one which so obviously reduces the 
world and its characteristics to a very materialistic model - - not unlike the efforts of 
Lucretius and Hobbes to whom, in effect, he had referred to establish his own ideas in 
Section I. While this new condemnation is consistent with the ostensible reasons for 
writing the tale, the reader may find the obvious contradiction somewhat disconcerting. 
The persona, however, takes measures throughout the remainder of Section II to adhere 
to his main purpose. This is made quite clear when, at a moment in the allegory when 
one of the brothers objects to a new and questionable interpretation of his father's will, he 
is chastised by his siblings for looking too deeply into the "Mystery" of it;
However, he objected again ... upon which he was 
taken up short, as one that spoke irreverently of a 
Mystery, which doubtless was very useful and 
significant, but ought not to be over-curiously pryed 
into, or nicely reasoned upon. (Swift, Writings. 309)
Recalling that one of the main goals of Hobbes and Lucretius was to eliminate the 
mysteries encouraged by religion and so free Man from the fear of what might happen to 
him in the afterlife, this is a well - placed and subtle jab at those men, and also a 
reinforcement of the importance of credulity within the scheme of religion. It certainly 
contributes to the protection of the system for which he is writing. Perhaps somewhat 
more confident that the "author" has found his true course, the reader is next invited into
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A Digression Concerning CrHicks, wherein is examined the feud between the ancients 
and the modems, and the true character of the "critick" is revealed.
In his description of critics, however, the persona again refers to the ancient 
Lucretius to explain their poisonous effect on authors:
Est etiam in magnis Heliconis montibus arbos,
Floris odore hominem retro consueta necare. Lib. 6.
Near Helicon, and round the Learned Hill,
Grow Trees whose Blossoms with their Odour kill
(Swift, Writings. 315)
Once more, the man who claimed to be a student of all things modem relies on his long 
dead literary forefather to clarify his point ... a fact made all the more ironic by his 
obvious ignorance of the Lucretian origins of the Leviathan he so detests.
Yet it is not until much later in A Tale of a Tub, in Section IX  A Digression 
Concerning the Original, the Use and Improvement o f Madness in a Commonwealth, 
that the persona attacks most energetically "the great Introducers o f new Schemes." 
About such persons he writes the following:
Let us next examine the great Introducers of new Schemes in 
Philosophy, and search till we can find, from what Faculty of 
the Soul the Disposition arises in mortal Man, of taking it into 
his Head, to advance new Systems with such an eager Zeal, in 
things agreed on all hands impossible to be known. ... Of this kind 
were Epicurus, Diogenes, Apollonius, Lucretius, Paracelsus, Des 
Cartes, and others; who, if they were now in the World, tied 
fast, and separate from their Followers, would in this our indis­
tinguishing Age, incur manifest Danger of Phlebotomy, and 
Whips, and Chains, and dark Chambers, and Straw. For, what 
Man in the natural State, or Course of Thinking, did ever conceive 
it in his Power, to reduce the Notions of all Mankind, exactly to 
the same Length, and Breadth, and Heighth of his own? ....
Epicurus, modestly hoped, that one Time or other, a certain 
Fortuitous Concourse of all Mens Opinions, after perpetual 
Justlings, the Sharp with the Smooth, the Light and the Heavy, the 
Round and the Square, would by certain Clinamina, unite in the
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Notions of Atoms and Void, as these did in the Originals of all 
Things. (Swift, Writings, 348)
The success or failure of such philosophies depends entirely upon luck, continues the 
persona, luck in striking a sympathetic chord at the right time with the right persons, 
who will then become disciples. Strike poorly, however, and you will be considered a 
fool. The persona indeed attributes the success of Epicurean and other philosophies 
(including those of Diogenes, Lucretius, and Des Cartes) to "my Phoenomenon o f 
Vapours, ascending from the lower Faculties to over-shadow the Brain, and there 
distilling into Conceptions, for which the Narrowness of our Mother-Tongue has not yet 
assigned any other Name, besides that of Madness or Phrenzy" (Swift, 348). It can be 
inferred, then, that the persona believes Epicurus, and so Hobbes, to be madmen. If  this 
be true, then, as suggested earlier, the persona is a madman as well; for in his own work 
does he not attempt "to reduce the Notions of all Mankind, exactly to the same Length, 
and Breadth, and Heighth of his own"? Further, and perhaps more important, does this 
not make him an ancient rather than a modem? In the course of his tale, the persona has 
lost his identity, and so arguably his credibility as a reliable source of criticism.
Yet, if he is mad, he goes further in this digression to argue against Hobbesian 
materialism. Using satire as his weapon, the persona proceeds to reveal that material 
explanations for spiritual concerns leave nothing more to the world of education than, 
ironically, a void. He gives materialism a chance to explain the differences in men - - 
those elements that create in one an Alexander the Great and in another a fool - - and the 
reasons for madness:
* There is in Mankind a certain * * * * *
* * * * * * * *  * * *
* * * * * * * *
Hie multa desiderantur
S t : * * * * * * *  *  *  *
* * * * * *  And this I take to be a clear






By making obvious the complete absence of the words that might have 
illuminated the utility of materialism, the persona brilliantly reveals the theory’s inability to 
do so, leaving behind a trail o f atom-like asterisks in place of philosophical information. 
The persona uses this disproving of reason to launch a campaign in favor of the 
imagination, offering that illusion rather than reality is the true road to happiness and 
peace. Note the following passage in which the persona emphasizes the importance of 
credulity over curiosity:
if it were not for the Assistance of Artificial 
Mediums, false Lights, refracted Angles, Varnish, and 
Tinsel; there would be a mighty Level in the Felicity and 
Enjoyments of Mortal Men. (Swift, Writings. 351)
Whereas Lucretius claimed that the elimination of mystery would serve to bring all men 
to a level with the gods, the brother of Grub Street insists that the result will instead be a 
levelling of happiness among them, who need the mystery, the omamenC, in order to 
remain content. Reason, he concludes, is akin to curiosity, which itself is a destructive 
force because it leads one beyond the surface, and away from the more peaceful and 
desirable state of credulity - - a state scorned by Lucretius and Hobbes. It may then be 
argued that Hobbes, so curious and insistent in exposing weakness and error in the 
well - established institutions of religion and government, is an enemy to oblivion, a state 
that the modem persona desires passionately, and which, in another awesome irony, he 
finds most commendable in the practices of Epicurus:
He that can with Epicurus content his Ideas 
with the Films and Images that fly off upon his Senses 
from the Superficies of Things; Such a Man truly 
wise, creams off Nature, leaving the Sower and the 
Dregs, for Philosophy and Reason to lap up. This is 
the sublime and refined Point of Felicity, called, the 
Possession o f being well deceived, The Serene Peaceful
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State of being a Fool among Knaves. (Swift, Writings. 352)
From this passage several conclusions can be extracted. First, the persona believes that 
those who attempt to reason too often are conniving knaves, while those who accept the 
superficial world are in the enviable position of being fools. Second, the practices of 
Epicurus to which the persona refers as a model of successful foolishness are his aesthetic 
indulgences - - his attempts to enjoy life as much as possible through satisfaction of his 
physical needs. This idea echoes the idea of the persona as Hobbes's "sensual man," and 
his appreciation for others of his ilk. Third, the persona ignores, or worse is unaware, 
that this contentment with "the Superficies of Things" stems from a deeply 
revolutionary, not to mention ancient, theory that denies that man's soul moves on from 
death to afterlife and, further, refuses to acknowledge any divinity in the creation of the 
world, relying instead on atomism and materialism to explain those things conventionally 
explained through the tenets o f religion. Thus, the entity that the persona so desires to 
protect - - religion - - becomes a casualty of his own philosophical concordance with his 
professed enemy, Hobbes. Such irony makes clear that the persona has reached his own 
ideal state. He is a credulous fool, uninterested in delving beneath the surface of any 
philosophy, including his own. As a result, throughout A Tale of a Tub he often extols 
out of ignorance the ideas against which he is meant to rage, and sinks, along with his 
tub, into a sea of madness.
m .
Study of the persona, however, does not automatically satisfy queries 
about the author of A Tale o f a Tub, Jonathan Swift himself. There is a strange 
relationship between Swift and the persona, while ostensibly they represent two diverse
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schools of thought - - Swift the well established ancients, and the persona the evolving 
moderns - - yet they share an odd kinship. In many ways, their differing styles and 
opinions lead each to the same conclusion, and in this sense the Dean aligns himself with 
the Grub Street fraternity more than perhaps he means to. Before the two are compared, 
however, it is best to look briefly at the man behind the work in order to discover his own 
ideas about the issues with which he deals in A Tale of a Tub. The most effective means 
of doing so is to sketch Swift's general attitude toward religion, modernism, and the 
status quo.
Swift's religious philosophy was relatively simple. He was an Anglican, and 
deeply rooted in the Church of England. Nevertheless, he was Irish as well and during 
his lifetime, which would eventually lead him to the Deanship of St. Patrick's in Ireland, 
he was witness to tumultuous religious events there. Arguably, it was these events that 
provided one of the major impulses to write the Tale. As Patrick Reilly explains in 
Jonathan Swift : The Brave Desponder, Swift experienced a great deal of frustration 
caused by certain restless Protestants:
Swift lived at Kilroot as Anglican divine surrounded 
by Presbyterian descendents of Scottish settlers at 
a time when Catholicism, however doctrinally re­
pugnant, had ceased to be a political threat. The 
Williamite settlement after Limerick ended for 
centuries the possibility of a Catholic property - 
owning class dominating Ireland and throughout the 
island the Catholics were reduced to helpless, impover­
ished servitude. The united Protestant front that had 
beaten the Popish, Gaelic threat could now break into 
its component parts, and in Ulster dissenters complained 
they had overthrown papal absolutism only to make a 
minority of Anglicans their new masters. Their grievances 
aroused Swift's anger and contempt - - he retorted 
sarcastically that he thought they had fought for the 
religious freedom which they now enjoyed; but freedom 
was apparently only the pretext to pursue power and 
the overthrow of the established Church. (Reilly, 65)
25
The last line of the passage above is of massive importance in understanding Swift's 
philosophy. His belief that freedom will lead to zealotry and rebellion is a driving force 
behind the tale's plot proper; three brothers who, after their father's death and against his 
will, take advantage of their liberty, manipulate the rules and eventually separate 
completely in order to form three new and different religions. A Tale of a Tub is more 
than a testament to the piety of its author, it is also an expression of his need for stability 
and the well tried lessons of the past.
Jonathan Swift is an ancient, a student of that seventeenth - century school 
which maintains that the only true models of literary excellence are the classics. Yet it 
must be asked, does Swift consider Lucretius an ancient? The classic origins of the latter 
were surely acknowledged by Swift as "ancient" in the technical sense, yet he goes on to 
at once attack him and use him to empower his own position in a frustratingly selective 
series of reactions. And although the persona is a satiric model of the detestable 
modem - - the writer who contests the sovereignty of the ancient masters - - the two 
can in fact be reconciled in one very important way: the ancient and the modem are 
equally scornful o f curiosity.
In many ways, Swift immersed himself in the past - - namely the seventeenth - 
century - - where he found for himself a comfortable place within a sea of intolerance 
(Reilly, 87). The impatience he harbored was especially reserved for new systems of 
belief and those persons or groups who questioned the already established tenets of 
religion and philosophy. Such a man was Thomas Hobbes who, with the help of 
Lucretius, attempted to remove mystery (and so fear of God) from the existence of man. 
Swift detested those who spurn inherited wisdom to seek new truths in morals and 
religion, they are, as John Stuart Mill suggests, "dissentients afflicted with the malady of 
thought, and society cannot survive when every man strives to become his own carver" 
(Reilly, 120). The status quo will falter. Though this portrait is vastly different from that
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of the modern persona, or any modem, still the two are rather closely allied. Swift 
despises curiosity, and explores that detestation with a curiosity for which he has, of 
course, given himself license, because it is a threat to the establishment and an invitation 
to anarchy. And yet it cannot be denied that Swift displays an irresistible attraction to 
chaos, especially in the way he writes the parody in A Tale of a Tub. Note the following 
analysis of this penchant by Claude Rawson:
The problem sometimes arises of just where the 
dominant focus lies: a parodic energy may blur a 
more central intention, and there may be a hiatus 
between a local parodic effect and the main drift 
of the discourse ... The cumulative effect of the 
Tale’s formidable parodic array is to convey a 
sense of intellectual and cultural breakdown so 
massive and so compelling that the parodied 
objects, as such, come to seem a minor detail.
(Rawson, 5)
Like Swift, the persona resents curiosity. However, his quarrel with it stems from 
his insistence that, as discussed earlier, it is simply more enjoyable to be credulous, to live 
with "the Assistance of Artificial Mediums, false Lights, refracted Angles, Varnish, and 
Tinsel" is eminently more powerful than to exist tainted with the odious and complicated 
nature of reason. The means are quite different, as are their causes, yet the result is the 
same. In the ways of both intellectual curiosity and political contentment with 
superficiality it is clear that Swift can be identified with his own disrespectful model of a 
modem.
Complicating the formula, however, is yet another Swiftean paradox. At the 
same time that Swift condemns Hobbes, he subscribes to him in various subtle and
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unmistakable ways. Just as the persona uses Epicurean/Lucretian philosophy in his attack 
against it, Swift’s writing accords with various aspects of Hobbes’s work, most notably in 
his personal letters and Gulliver’s Travels, which cast doubt on his supposed contempt for 
new and, keeping in mind Hobbes's connection with Lucretius and Epicurus, old 
philosophy. Swift seems to draw from and adhere to certain ideas of Hobbes while he 
vociferously condemns the rest of them. If he was trapped in the seventeenth century, 
Swift was in many ways stuck with Hobbes, an original to those one hundred years.
Having held correspondence with peers of renown equal to his own, including 
Alexander Pope and John Gay, Swift was able to express to them his honest opinions on 
most subjects. His feelings for mankind were no exception. In a letter to the Reverend 
Thomas Sheridan, dated 11 September 1725, Swift explains to the recently disappointed 
young man the following;
If you are indeed a discarded Courtier, you have reason to complain, but 
none at all to wonder; you are too young for many Experiences to fall in your 
way, yet you have read enough to make you know the Nature o f Man. It is safer 
for a Man's Interest to blaspheme God, than to be of a Party out of Power, or even 
to be thought so .... expect no more from Man than such an Animal is capable of, 
and you will every day find my Description of Yahoes more resembling.
(Swift, Writings. 583-584)
The bitterness contained within these lines may well be attributed to Swift's own 
negative experience at court. Nevertheless, he expresses unmistakably a contempt not 
only for royals, but for the ’’Animal" that is man. At this time, Swift was undoubtedly 
working on Gulliver's Travels, which would be released for circulation the following year. 
His reference to "Yahoes," which would become the negative moniker for the humanlike 
creatures in Book IV, emphasizes that Swift's opinion of humankind strongly reflected 
Hobbesian ideas. This position is continually supported by evidence from later letters. In 
one to Alexander Pope on 29 September 1725, Swift asserts,
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principally I hate and detest that animal called man, although I hartily 
love John, Peter, Thomas and so forth, this [sic] is the system upon which 
I have governed my self many years. . . and so I shall go on until I have done 
with them I have got Materials Towards a Treatis proving the falsity of 
that Definition animal rationale; and to show it should be only rationis 
capax. Upon this great foundation of Misanthropy.. The whole building of 
my Travells is erected. (Swift, Writings, 584-585)
Here it is clear that it is not each man ("John, Peter, Thomas and so forth") in and of 
himself that is the object of disgust. Rather it is the nature of mankind at which he volleys 
his criticism. In this letter as well Swift declares unmistakably his intentions for Gulliver's 
Travels: it is a "Treatis" based on that misanthropy which the author finds abundant in his 
fellow man and, arguably, in himself. Swift, like Hobbes, reveals a quarrel with the idea 
that men are fundamentally rational beings, and intends to prove his point in the story of 
Lemuel Gulliver. The commonly, and comfortably, held belief in human enlightenment by 
the masses has long been denied by some philosophers. John Locke, in an attack on the 
idea of human virtue as innate, selected several cultures in which seemingly universal 
"rules" such as preservation of children are completely denied, he thus asserts that if the 
most powerful, most basic moral principles can be ignored, then none can be innate 
(Ehrenpreis, 20). Swift was no stranger to these ideas, and explored them in A Modest 
Proposal as well as in personal correspondence and Gulliver's Travels. In yet another 
letter from Swift to Pope on 26 November 1725 he writes, "I tell you after all that I do 
not hate Mankind, it is vous autres who hate them because you would have them 
reasonable Animals, and are Angry for being disappointed. I have always rejected that 
Definition and made another of my own" (Swift, Writings, 586). In stating that because 
mankind is not a reasonable race it cannot be held accountable for actions less than 
honorable, Swift essentially robs society of its comfortable morality and labels it foolish.
To regard man as such in his letters is a relatively safe means of expression; to make them 
known as such in public writings, as Swift vowed he would, is to involve himself deeply in
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political and social controversy. The student of Swift will be aware that controversy was 
a tempest from which he did not fly; and in Gullivers Travels he courts it most boldly, 
allowing his own characteristics of Hobbism to reveal themselves. Here, Swift uses the 
many adventures o f Lemuel Gulliver to investigate freedom, selfishness, and human 
nature, and to express an opinion that, though originating in the mind of a "Church of 
England Man," demonstrates a strong influence by Thomas Hobbes, and thereby 
Epicurean/Lucretian tradition.
In Part I: A Voyage to Lilliput, Lemuel Gulliver begins his fantastic series of 
journeys by finding himself, by the force of nature, deposited on the shores o f Lilliput, 
where he first glimpses the force o f his own nature. Upon awakening to find himself 
bound by ropes, Gulliver immediately sets the tone of our and his own reactions to the tiny 
people whom he discovers are his captors by constantly referring to them as "creatures." 
The description of their movements, especially in terms of Gulliver's gigantic frame, 
suggests an insect-like quality. Gulliver's immediate reaction, quite condescending in tone, 
is followed directly by an animalistic instinct to lash out against his situation. Finding 
himself under such odd conditions, and at the mercy of such incredible captors, Gulliver 
describes his state of mind in one of the first and best references to Hobbesian theory in 
the entire piece:
I confess I was often tempted, while they were passing 
backwards and forwards on my Body, to seize Forty or 
Fifty of the first that came in my Reach, and dash them 
against the ground. But the Remembrance of what I had 
felt, which probably might not be the worst they could 
do; and the Promise of Honour I made them, for so I 
interpreted my submissive Behaviour, soon drove out 
those Imaginations. Besides, I now considered myself 
bound by the Laws of Hospitality to a People who had 
treated me with so much Expence and Magnificence.
(Swift, Writings, 8)
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Gulliver’s animalistic desire to harm the industrious yet annoying "creatures," the concern 
he displays for his own safety, and his subsequent decision to submit to the "Laws" of 
Lilliputian society in order to maintain it are Hobbesian enough on their own. The added 
element, however, of the captive's knowledge of his own power and the likelihood of 
success in its exercise completes the parallel to Hobbes's model of the necessary contract 
between men in order to survive. In Leviathan Thomas Hobbes offered a model of society 
in which he asserted that concessions such as Gulliver's were necessary to tame the beast 
in men and ensure a relatively peaceful coexistence. Take the following passage from 
Part I: O f Man, Chapter XIV; O f the first and second Naturall Lawes, and o f Contracts, 
which describes in words the theory of society that brings Gulliver to his decision to 
submit:
because the condition of Man . . . is a condition
of Warre of every one against every one; in which case
every one is governed by his own Reason . . . it
followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a
Right to everything; even to one anothers body. And
therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man
to everything endureth, there can be no security to
any man ... And consequently it is a precept, or generall
rule of Reason, That every man, ought to endeavour
Peace, as farre as he has hope o f obtaining it. (Leviathan, 189-190)
From what he calls the "Fundamentall Law of Nature" to "seek Peace and follow 
it," Hobbes derives the second "Law of Nature,"
That a man be willing, when others are so too, as 
farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence o f himselfe he 
shall think itnecessary, to lay down his right to all things; and 
be contented with so much liberty against other men, as 
he would allow other men against himselfe. (Leviathan. 190)
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Upon this first encounter with the Hobbesian instinct in himself, Gulliver embarks 
on a journey of human discovery parallel with that of the physical and intellectual. Later, 
in Chapter III of Book I, Gulliver is set free only by entering into contract with the rulers 
of Lilliput, a freedom questionable in definition, as we are told by the surgeon that he is 
bound to certain "Articles and Conditions," the performance of which he was made to 
swear "first in the Manner o f ... [his] own Country, and afterwards in the Method 
prescribed by their Laws" (Swift, 25).
After his escape from Lilliput and upon his arrival in Brobdingnag in Part II, 
Gulliver is transformed from the giant to the insect as he is taken in and ultimately 
exploited by the enormous Brobdingnagians. Again, he is held captive, this time not by 
chains, but by the frustrating knowledge that any attempt at rebellion or escape is 
hopeless; and again he acknowledges his weakened position within his new society, 
deciding ultimately that he must, in order to remain intact, submit to the wills and laws of 
Brobdingnagian society. In short, he must behave in a Hobbesian manner. Having 
decided and acted upon this decision, Gulliver is given a kind of liberty. He is certainly 
treated well, even doted upon by the women of the race, with his own governess and a 
queen who becomes so fond of him "that she could not dine without" him. In the end, 
however, Gulliver is treated as a curious house pet, compelled by the king to perform 
various tricks, and endowed with a perspective that for the first time allows him to see 
magnified the gross elements of the human body. This sort o f freedom is, like that he 
experienced in Lilliput, o f questionable merit. In the first two voyages, Swift attempts to 
disentangle the meaning and possibility of freedom in Gulliver's imprisonments, and finds 
easy answers to his queries in Hobbes's simple notion that freedom is in essence the 
absence of "external impediments;" for in both Lilliput and Brobdingnag it is easy to 
discern, by this definition, when Gulliver is actually "free" (Reilly, 57-58). Having 
willfully escaped from both countries, even after giving his word of honor to perform 
certain duties, and becoming aware that his fate could have been much worse if not for the
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relative kindness of both races of captors, Gulliver has proven himself a good Hobbesian; 
for he has, despite his contracts, allowed his self-preservation first priority, and acted in 
such a way as to ensure it (Reilly, 22). Evidence for this assumption can be found in 
countless passages o f Hobbes's Leviathan, most notably in Part II: O f Common - Wealth, 
wherein he writes the following:
In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to
speak now, of the Liberty o f Subjects. For
seeing there is no Common - wealth in the world,
wherein there be Rules enough set down for the
regulating of all actions, and words of men, (as being
a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that
in all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted, men
have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons
shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. (Leviathan, 264)
In essence, then, Gulliver is following the simple formula set out by Hobbes that allows 
him to take action in preserving his own life, self-preservation is the first law of nature for 
Hobbes, and it is a liberty granted under the idea of the "voluntary” contract, which, 
though necessary, is not in and of itself the most important part of man's existence. These 
ideas o f freedom, so clearly defined in the first two voyages of Gulliver's Travels, become 
more complex as Gulliver finds himself a prisoner not only to foreigners, but to the society 
of his fellow men - - to humanity itself, which he has grown to associate with animal 
brutality - - until at last he submits to the noble horses in Part IV: A Voyage to the 
Country o f the Houynhnms.
Resigning himself to Houyhnhnm society, calling one of its members "master," 
there is a strong indication that Gulliver is happy to enter into contract with the horses, is 
almost relieved to be in a society of what he thinks reasonable and enlightened creatures. 
Having asserted to his master that his own country is run by Yahoos, Gulliver has as well
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acknowledged that his home is one governed by beasts, all of whom may be considered 
the culmination of every gross and dull-minded creature he has met during his four sea 
voyages. The horses certainly live in harmony with one another; and the contrast between 
them and the Yahoos, or humans, and the penchant of that species for deceit as a means of 
self-preservation is undeniably sharp both to Gulliver and the careful reader. Hobbes 
addresses the subject of dishonesty, in a passage in Leviathan about words and their 
abuses, citing four main offenses: self-deception, deception of others, false representation 
of one's will or desire, and the causing of grief to others (Leviathan. 102). One can relate 
the first two abuses directly to Gulliver; for he has until now deceived himself as to the 
true nature of man in his defense of his country and his purposeful concealment of certain 
unattractive elements of his own society - - this all during conversation with the curious 
horses. Having, however, arrived into the company of creatures he thinks to be the zenith 
of reason and truth, he is all too aware of the differences in attitude concerning truth and 
speech; to reinforce this contrast, his master tells him "That the Use of Speech was to 
make us understand one another, and to receive Information of Facts; now if any one said 
the Thing which was not, these Ends were defeated" (Swift, 207).
When finally exiled by the horses, Gulliver finds himself a changed man. Had he 
remained himself throughout his travels, Gulliver would have been overjoyed to meet Don 
Pedro, his saviour; for the kind mariner, who by virtue of his deeds as well as his name, 
easily translated "St. Peter," is arguably the only symbol of human goodness with which 
Gulliver meets, and is indeed the very evidence that a more alert man might use to rebuild 
some faith in humanity (though Gulliver does admit to Don Pedro's "Very good human 
Understanding") (Swift, 253). But Gulliver is completely altered, and so too is his notion 
of freedom; he no longer wishes to live in a society of human beings, all of whom he now 
considers Yahoos. Evidence of this attitude, and of Swift’s own cynicism, can be found by 
looking again at the name of Gulliver's savior. For the last name of Don Pedro (St. Peter) 
is Mendez, a word which equates with the Spanish word for "liar," mendaz (Cassell's.
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418). In the Portuguese language, Mendez conies closest to the word for "beggar," 
mendigo (Basic Dictionary, 685). Such wordplay identifies Don Pedro as a lying saint, 
and emphasizes Gulliver's deteriorating opinion of his fellow man - - even the kindest of 
souls, he believes, is somehow inherently unworthy of trust. He has seen Hobbes's animal, 
and wants never to return to so-called "civilized" society again. Interestingly, he does not 
equate himself with the Yahoos of his world , and so it may be acknowledged, ironically, 
that he himself has fulfilled the Hobbesian requirement o f narcissistic, self-preservating 
savagery. Thus, Gulliver, the persona, becomes the object o f Swift's satire. Yet return he 
must, and so Gulliver finds himself on the border o f his own jungle, once the England - - 
the home - - he loved, and void of the love of humanity he possessed before his adventures 
began.
Throughout Gulliver'sTravels there lay countless Hobbesian doors waiting to be 
opened. Each lends itself to the decoding of Lemuel Gulliver's journey from peaceable 
Englishman to hopeless misanthrope, a journey that Swift seems to share to the exclusion 
of allowing himself to become that which he scorns (thus his selective use of arguments 
and his gentle sojourns into hypocrisy). As Gulliver himself crosses each new threshold he 
is drawn further and further away from the ideals of men like Don Pedro, and deeper into 
the dark state of nature of Thomas Hobbes. So often held captive by fetters, Gulliver is at 
these times at his most blessed; for he remains unaware of the nature of man and the evils 
which, so claims Hobbes and believes Swift, it embraces, thereby remaining at liberty for 
intellectual and emotional optimism. His idealism and patriotism, however, cannot protect 
him from what he comes to find as a harsh reality, the knowledge of which will prevent his 
ever living in peace with his fellow human beings again. Lemuel Gulliver has learned that 
in the state of nature, reason and true liberty are impossible, "And the life of man, solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short" (Leviathan. 186).
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Swift's works commonly attempt to introduce mankind to itself, most often 
employing satire to create a looking glass which, when held up to the visage of humanity, 
reflects a being sometimes monstrous, and often ignorant. And while the ignorance 
against which he rails is bom mainly of new and untried systems of thought, some, such 
as Thomas Hobbes's De Homine and Leviathan, find their origins in classical sources 
which, as an ancient, Swift supposedly espoused. Ironically, Swift distorts his own 
principles by using elements of those ideas he detests to empower his argument. A Tale of 
a Tub was ostensibly written to contest Leviathan, a work which was odious to Swift 
because of its attempt to remove mystery from the minds of man. And yet in the first of 
many ironies, Swift draws from Leviathan those characteristics that most conveniently 
agree with his own ideas of the nature of man, discarding the rest, many of which find 
their origins in the ideas of ancients such as Epicurus and Lucretius. Further, the persona 
of A Tale of a Tub is a modem, content with the superficiality of forms, and disdainful of 
curiosity. He is everything, one assumes, that the ancient Swift is not. Still, in his writings 
one finds countless traces of his own leanings toward the ideas of Hobbes, as well as 
characteristics shared with the modem he so scorns. For Swift also robs man of his status 
as animal rationale and, like the modem, urges him not to be curious, not to attempt to 
remove from life its mysteries, and so its fears. It is the fear, Swift believes, that ensures a 
peaceful coexistence among men. Further, a study of Swift's letters and Gulliver's Travels 
reveals a strong connection between the Dean and the Hobbist school o f thought. Though 
he claims to rage against Leviathan, especially the tenets within it that seek to reassure and 
embolden man as Lucretius and Epicurus did, he nevertheless agrees with Hobbes's 
definition of man and his natural state. Cautioning friends to ''expect no more from Man 
than such an Animal is capable of, and you will every day find my Description of Yahoes 
more resembling" (Swift, 584), Swift echoes many of Hobbes's own observations, such as 
that man is a selfish brute, is innately bad, and is consequently thrust into a common 
contract with his kind. Such ironic and seemingly hypocritical similarities between Swift
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and Hobbes cast doubt on Swift's intentions - - especially those behind A Tale of a Tub. 
Although expressly meant to debunk Leviathan, in reality A Tale of a Tub takes issue only 
with those elements of Leviathan that Swift finds most threatening to his own philosophies 
and those of the ancient school. Such selectivity reveals little about Swift's true opinion of 
Hobbes. It is certain, however, that the entity that Swift finds most frightening is not 
Hobbes's work, but the possibility of its accuracy.
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